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Glossary 
• discount factor : d.f. = —e where F{t) is the discount function. For 
f[t) = Q1 \ve have d.f. = ,6 
• discount function : function F{T,t) that stands for the subjective weight given 
to the instant Utilities of different periods, when aggregating for the total in- 
tertemporal utility. It is a function of r the time of evaluation and t the time 
gap between the time of the evaluation and the time of the instantaneous utility 
considered. 
• discount rate : d.r. = where F{t) is the discount function. For F{t) = (d1 
we have d.r. = —Inp 
• exponential discount : the most common time discount also called geometric 
discount (because of the geometric series p1) or constant discount (because of 
the constant discount factor and rate). It is represented by F{t) = p1 with 
discount factor p or by F{t) = e~pt with discount rate p. Exponential discount 
is equivalent to stationary and consistent discount. 
• hyperbolic discount : subjective stationary time discount whose discount func- 
tion is a generalized hyperbola. The most common form is given by F{t) = 
(1 + at)~b,a whose discount rate is where o > 0 and close to 1 and 6 > 0 
usually close but lower than 1. The discount rate starts as b and tends to zero. 
• present-biased preferences : any time discount where the immediate discount 
rate is higher than the médium and long rim discount rates, (non-stantard 
definition) 
• quasi-hyperbolic discount : subjective discrete time discount, which resembles 
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in some way the hyperbolic discount. Its discount function is given by F(0) = 1 
and F{n) = I36n. 
• stationary preferences : at difFerent periods future events are discounted in the 
same fashion, that is F is just a function of t and not of r. 
• time inconsistency : behaviours/preferences are said to be time inconsistent if 
(in the absence of any new information) agents at some period have new optimal 
plans and want to discard former ones. Formally there is time inconsistency 
7^ F(r+A,'í2-A) ^or some A, that is the discount factor between 
two events depends on the time of evaluation. 
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Abstract 
We analyze in a simple three period model, how the time inconsistency of agents affects 
the endogenous rates of return of assets determined by the equilibrium in an exchange econ- 
omy with consumption and exogenous endowments. We model the intertemporal decisions 
according to Phelps and Pollak (1968) - taking the actions of the agents as the rcsult of a 
game between different "selves" in different decision nodes - and consider the most common 
case of "present-biased" preferences. The rates will be formally different from the consistency 
case. namely they will depend on future endowments, both with stochastic and deterministic 
endowment processes. This enables the distinction between time consistent and inconsistent 
preferences from the data. It also implies that the estimation of expected endowments from 
market data depends on the type of preferences of the representative agent. Under endow- 
ment uncertainty we conclude that even though the determination of the rates of return can be 
largely affected this does not lead to significantly different risk premia. Moreover distinctive 
mformation gaps between "selves" does not account for distinctive results, even though the 
results depend strongly on their interaction. Finally, we propose and apply to the different 
cases, a new method for discount comparison. 
Keywords ; Intertemporal Choice, Intertemporal Consumer Choice, Noncooperative 
Games, Microeconomic Behaviour: Underlying Principies, Exchange and Produc- 
tion Economies, Asset Pricing. 
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E p'rá amanhã 
Bem podias fazer hoje 
Porque amanhã sei que voltas a adiar 
(...) 
E p'rá amanhã 
Bem podias viver hoje 
Porque amanhã quem sabe se vais cá estar 
(...) 
E p'rá amanhã 
Deixa lá não faças hoje 
Porque amanhã tudo se há-de arranjar1 
António Variações 
1 Introduction 
Macroeconomical models concerning intertemporal decision making usually as- 
sume time consistent preferences. That is to say that agents" optimal choices are 
independent of the time of evaluation (in the case of perfect foresight obviously). 
In a deterministic setting an individual will always take the decisions he planned to 
take some time ago. 
Models also assume additive preferences2 which means that instantaneous Utili- 
ties are aggregated acioss time periods and across states of nature using a sum. It 
is straightforward to see that (time stationary^) additive preferences are time con- 
sistent if and only if there is no time discount at ali or if the discount is constant. If 
'Ifs for tomorrow! / You could well do it today / Because I know you ll postpone it again tomorrow It s for 
tomorrow! / You could well live today / Because who knows if you ll he here tomorrow // ffs for tomorrow! Let 
it be, don't do it today / Because tomorrow you'll manage everything 
2More on different aggregate utiiity structures in Backus, Routledge and Zin (2004) 
3Time stationarity means that instantaneous Utilities are discounted with the same discount function regardless of 
the decision period. In other words the discount weight depends solely on the time gap f between the decision and the 
enjoyment. In this study only stationary preferences are considered because non-stationaritv at the macroeconomical 
levei seems unreasonable. For an approach with non-stationary preferences see Kocherlakota (2001), 
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the discouiit factor is to be constant the discount function is an exponential. That 
is whv constant discount is sometimes referred as "exponential" discount. 
The present work is intended to explore the consequences of relaxing this hypoth- 
esis considering non-constant discount rates. We sum up the work that has heen 
done and present a basic general equilibriurn asset pricing model. 
As a matter of fact there has been growing evidence that agents do not have 
time consistent preferences. Borrowing an example from Ainslie (1991), "a majority 
of adults report that they uiould rather have $50 immediately than $100 in 2 years, 
but alrnost no one prefers $50 in 4 years over $100 in 6 years, even though this 
is the same choice seen at 4 years greater distance". The discount factor between 
today and two years from today (a two year gap) is bigger than between four and 
six years of distance (two year gap also), technically speaking the discount rate is 
not constant. Constant (or exponential) discount means having the same levei of 
impatience between today and a month from now, and between the Ist of January 
and the Ist of February of 2100. No experiment may ever support this assump- 
tion. Experimental evidence indicates that time is not discounted with exponen- 
tial discount functions (and constant discount rates) but generalized hyperbolic-like 
discount functions (with decreasing discount rates). Individuais are said to have 
present-biased" preferences because small time gaps in the near future and long 
time gaps in the far future are perceived equally. 
This raises a time consistency problem. Using Ainslie's example, an individual 
who opted for the $100 in 6 years will probably change his mind after 4 years. He 
will prefer having $50 by then. How agents act given this inconsistency and how 
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their behaviour should he modelled is however an open question. 
Two basic theoretical hypothesis have been considered. Agents may not realize 
their inconsistency and exhibit the so-called ''naive" behaviour. They naively believe 
they will pursue previous optimal plans but keep engaging in new ones. Typically 
naive agents continuously overconsume today relying on their future savings abili- 
ties. Everyday evidence is easy to find. On the other hand agents realizing their 
time inconsistent preferences may a have rational attitude and try to follow a time 
consistent plan. Taking in mind that their future impulses cannot be controlled but 
can be foreseen, the so-called "sophisticated1" individuais are able to depict a plan 
that will actually be followed. When someone chooses to fulfill some duty today in- 
stead of postponing it, just because he knows he would postpone it again tomorrow. 
that person is acting like a sophisticate. This behaviour is modelled considering a 
subgame perfect equilibrium of a game between the "selves" of different periods. 
Statements like "do not let me do this or that" is also an everyday example of 
a sophisticated attitude but of a different kind. The individual knows he will be 
wanting to do something non-optimal from today's perspective and wishes to bind 
his future actions, that is he wants to precommit his future actions. Sophisticates 
would like to have some commitment devices (illiquid assets is a financial example) 
and so different models are classified according to the existence and tvpe of these 
devices. Sophisticates come in three Havours: no-commitment, partial-commitment 
and full-commitment. 
Our focus will be on asset pricing and our motivation on exploring the impli- 
cations of inconsistency on the trade-off between risk and return of assets on the 
9 
individual and on the general equilibrium levei. Thus we will he able to address both 
behaviour and inacroeconomic changes. And wc emphasize the later one, because 
the time inconsistency literature deals mainly with partial equilibrium results. 
Likewise there is few work on non-constant discount with uncertainty. The risk 
aversion is strongly related with the attitude of agents towards time so some changes 
would be expected. In this sense we shall examine the equity risk premia for it is 
widely known that the estimated risk aversion leveis do not account for the observed 
high premia. 
We present an application of these ideas in a simple general equilibrium three 
period asset pricing model in a pure exchange economy. Three periods is the min- 
imum number with which inconsistency issues arise; in a two period model, the 
last period problem is always straightforward. The differences between naives and 
sophisticates are clarified. Deterministic and stochastic endowment processes are 
both analyzed. When comparing the exponential and the hyperbolic discounts we 
refrain from pointing out quantitative differences that simply disappear in a calibra- 
tion. Observationally distinguishable qualitativo differences will be our main point. 
Second we introduce a compensated parameter variation so that calibration-proof 
quantitative conclusions are possible. 
We show that the intertemporal trade-off of sophiscates is more complex than 
that of naives or time consistent individuais. It is not just a savings/consumption 
choice but also a confhct between today's and tomorrow's optimal plans. On one 
hand present-bias puts a strong emphasis on immediate consumption relying on 
future savings. On the other knowing that tomorrow the agent will have the same 
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attitude, he will have an incentive to save more today. As a consequence of this 
complex equilibrium, short-run interest rates at time t will not only depend on the 
endowments of time t and t + 1 but on future (expected) endowments. This is 
true in the absence of long-nm assets, as it happens in our model. Moreover the 
elasticity of sub-titution levei is a fundamental parameter for the outcome of the 
trade-off. High elasticity (utility function with positive homogeneity degreej may 
lead to an intriguing increase in savings in case of a future endowment growth. A 
natural consequence of these conclusions is that time consistent and inconsistent 
preferences are observationally unlike concerning general equilibrium asset prices. 
This contradicts the results of Kocherlakota (2001). 
It is shown in the last section that stochastic endowment and asset pavoffs pro- 
cesses do not introduce any new feature comparing with the deterministic situation. 
The strategical interaction between selves remains broadly unchanged including for 
different information structures. In the end we focus on the equity premium puz- 
zle and conclude that inconsistent preferences should not account for significantly 
different risk premia. 
The present work is structured as following: section 2 contains a review on time 
inconsistent discounting, in section 3 we solve simple asset pricing models without 
uncertainty and discuss different issues mentioned in section 2. section 4 contains 
the main model with a riskless and a risky asset where we analyze the consequences 
on risk premia, and our conclusions are summarized in section õ. 
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2 Non-constant Time Discounting and Literature Review 
Xext \ve suni up important facts on time discount and present a survey (followed 
h\' a criticai analysis) on non-constant time discount. Some of the few work on asset 
pricing is also presented. 
2.1 Time Incousistency 
Time discount is used when agents have additive Utilities (we will not consider 
other cases) and perceive equal instantaneous utility leveis differently depending on 
the time gap between today and the enjoyment. It enables the matching between 
two intertemporal plans through the attribution of different time weights when ag- 
gregating instantaneous Utilities. 
In a deterministic and perfect information economy can be easily shown (see 
Strotz (1956)) that the only possibility of having dynamically consistent decisions, 
that is tomorrow's optimal choice from today's perspective being exactly the same as 
tomorrow"s optimal choice from tomorrowT perspective, is considering exponential 
discounting, that is a constant discount rate. Note that with F{t) — /T being the 
discount function we have 
F{p) _ F{q) _ nA y A 
Fip + A) F{q + A) ' P'9' 
meaning that when we compare two events with utility leveis assigned to different 
periods, only the time interval A between them and not the time between today 
(f = 0) and either of them {p or q), does matter. Tliis implies that whenever 
the agent matches the present value of the utility of both, he will take the same 
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choice. Reasoning graphically Ainslie (1992) points out that "discountmg curves 
must cross to produce ambivalence". Discounting curves represent present values 
of future events depending on the time of evaluation. When they cross we have 
inconsistency. Just before the "crossing time" there is one action that is preferred 
towards the other. But just after the crossing time, the agent would take exactly 
the opposite decision. 
There is quite a lot of everyday evidence that we do not have time consistent 
preferences that is agents do not discount the time at a constant rate. Statements 
or "self-promises" like "77/ eat just this ice cream, and start my diet tomorrouj" 
and "7 have postponed this work for too long, I must start it tomorrow" are com- 
mon examples. Other more complex economic examples will be mentioned below. 
We underline that this kind of behaviour of changing our own plans and of self- 
enforcement, is not due to uncertainty or new information available that obviouslv 
would lead to a change in plans, but entirely to time inconsistency. We often post- 
pone unpleasurable actions and advance pleasurable ones relatively to our previous 
plans. 
This preferences anomaly (sometimes referred as present-bias), if we take the 
exponential discount as benchmark, is the most commonly considered in the time 
inconsistency literature, which mathematically speaking stands for a decreasing dis- 
count rate in the immediate future. But there is another anomaly regarding the 
long-run. As we move faraway from the present the dates become almost irrelevant. 
so that the utility of a revenue (or cost) in 2060 or 2061 perceived todav is almost 
the same. Mathematically the discount rate tends to zero. As we will be dealing 
with 3 period models this detail will not come up. Its mathematical complexity is 
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prohably the reason for which it was despised in the literature. 
2.2 Earlier Literature on Non-constaut Discount 
Though not explicit, Bòhm-Bawerk's work "'Positive Theorie des Kapitals" (1889) 
is the first reference on non-constant discount Pointing out that "there may be a 
strong difference between an enjoyment which offers itself at the very instant, and 
one which does not; while, on the other hand, there may he a very small difference, 
or no difference at ali, between an enjoyment which is pretty far away, and one which 
is farther away". That is the immediate discount is high and the faraway future 
discount in nearly zero. Obviously he could not realize the consequences, for there 
was not any discount notion, and it was not until Strotz (1956) that the problem 
was analyzed. Strotz's work is quite revolutionary, established new concepts and 
is still a benchmark. Strotz suggests different behaviours due to the existence of 
non-constant discount rates. Based on everyday situations, he assumes (correctly) 
that agents discount time at a decreasing discount rate, meaning that the subjective 
relative weight given to two events one week apart from each other, decreases, or 
tends even to zero as they are further away from the present. Put simply, the 
discount between today and tomorrow is more or less the same as, imagine, between 
January 2050 and January 2055. This is depicted in Figure 1. Actually Strotz did 
not propose any specific discount function, but showed his ideas graphically. 
Strotz speculates about the consequences of the re-evaluation of some former 
optimal plan, that had been pursued so far, without any new information. He 
argues that usually the uoptimal plan as seen today" will not be optimal as seen 
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Figure 1: Exponential e 0'3í (straight) and hyperbolic (l+í) 1 (dashed) time discount; a) discount 
functions; b)discount rates 
tomorrow Ubecause the discount function has been shifted 4. Strotz adds that "it 
would be a mistake to conclude that, even under condítions of certainty, the optimal 
curve is the one which the individual will actually follow In this case he would 
set a new consumption curve and some time later would again recognize that he is 
not following the optimal curve, etc... Strotz calls this the "intertemporal tussle". 
Intuitively, having planned a week ago that I would lunch today at a cheap cafeteria 
because I should save the money for next month"s holidays to which I assigned 
a greater utility than the lunch, today I assign a greater utility to going to an 
expensive restaurant than to the savings. The main point here is that having a 
constant discount rate, the relative weight of the lunch and the holidays would be 
constant only depending on the time distance between them and not between any 
of them and the decision point. But if we consider the discount function that Strotz 
proposes, this weight also depends on the distance to the decision point0. According 
'He also recognized that the only discount function that does not lead to this inconsistency, is the exponential. 
which he calls the "harmony" case. 
5Another example reinterpreted from Strotz: some "buy it now, pay it next year" promotions clearly take 
advantage of this inconsistency. Even if the instant disutility of the cost is greater than the instam utility of the 
purchase, postponing it can change the relation of the present-valued Utilities. 
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I 
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to Strotz it the agent does not recognize this inconsistency in advance, he keeps 
"n pudtafnig ' his "past plnns" describing a "spendthnft" trajectory. 
Strotz proposes two possibilities for the agent who recognizes this tussle. He may 
precoinmit his future actions, that is to bind his future actions according to his 
present optimal plan. Statements like "do not let me do that" or self-promises are 
some examples of precommitment. But regarding the whole consumption plan, this 
means that there should be a precise time in the past where today's actions where 
determined and that even though the agent recognizes today their non-optimality, 
he will not change his acts. 
The second possibility is following a "consistent planning" strategy, that accord- 
ing to Strotz should be "the best plan among those he will actually follow" tak- 
ing into account "an insight into his future unreliability". According to Strotz's 
point of view this implies the recognition that he is only able to set and pur- 
sue the optimal consumption plan for a very sraall interval of time At. So he 
draws his optimal consumption plan during this interval assuming that the plan is 
fixed after the interval. In Strotz's stock consumption model this implies having 
F{t - t)/F{t — t) — -iic{t)/uc{t), where r is the present time and uc is the marginal 
utility of consumption. Letting t ^ t Strotz concludes erroneously (as shown below) 
that we will have F(0)/F(0) = —iic{t)/uc{t) at ali points, that is along ali consump- 
tion periods. Ali discounting curves would then be equivalent to an exponential e^pt 
with p = —F(0)/F(0). 
As Pollak (1968) points out this result is intuitively wrong. It would mean that 
two different discounting curves would lead to the same behaviour. To see that it is 
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also mathernatically wrong (and following Pollak) imagine having discrete decision 
points distancing Aí from each other. The consumption path in the decisions points 
(that split the intervals) will usually not be continuous much less differentiable. It 
is then a mistake to admit that the differential equation is valid at ali points as 
Aí -> 0. 
Besides being mathernatically wrong it is hard to say that Strotz"s agent recog- 
nizes his inconsistency. It represents a continuous recognition of the non-optimality 
of yesterday's plan and the setting of a new one. In other words Strotz"s agent is 
exactly the opposite: someone who never recognizes the inconsistency and keeps 
reevaluating. 
Phelps and Pollak (1968) proposed a consistent model that is still used today. 
Working in a discrete6 Ramsey-like growth model describe the behaviour of a rep- 
resentativo agent who is aware that he cannot set the actions of future generations 
because they will later default. They propose a game theory approach. where today"s 
generation plays with tomorrow's. Using backward induction. that is taking into ac- 
count the behaviour of tomorrow's generations (the way they will later default), the 
representative agent chooses his optimal consumption for his period maximizing his 
aggregate utility. Assuming that the future generations will have a certain constant 
savings rate and using the same discount function for ali generation, they find the 
best response (in terms of the savings rate) for that future savings rate strategy. 
There is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium when the best response rate equals 
the future rate, and this should represent the generation"s behaviour. They call it 
"the second-best optimurri" in opposition to the "first best" where the representative 
bThe continuous counter-part is barely imaginable. Soe Barro (1999) for an counter-example. 
I 
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agent ocnild control future (lecisions, that is he would be able to precommit. In the 
secoud-best case the saviugs rate is clearly lower. They show that ali generations 
would beneht with a raise in the saviugs rate, that is this equilibrium is definitely 
non Pareto optimal. 
The discreto discount function they use, later nicknamed as "quasi-hyperbolic" 
by Laibson (1996), is given by the sequence 
1, 135, f362, /3ò3,... 
where 3 ~ 2/3 and S ~ 0.95 according to Laibson, has two big advantages: it 
captures the overvaluation of the present relatively to the irnmediate future that 
generates the inconsistency and the game between generations, and it is mathemat- 
ically easily treatable. Unfortunately it fails to capture the assymptotic approach 
to zero of the discount rate in the far future. Note that after the second period, this 
function corresponds to an exponential discount, whose discount rate is constant. 
Figure 2 shows three possible discrete discount functions7. 
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In a note appcmled to this article Pollak (1968) applies the generation conflict to a 
conflict inside one's mind. He calls "naive" to individuais who do not recognize their 
inconsistency and keep rethinking their optimal plan. This is Strotz s '"intertemporal 
tussle". They are naive in the sense that they believe they will follow the freshly 
conceived plan. In opposition he calls "sophisticated" to individuais who rnake 
a "consistent planning" out of their time inconsistent preferences, solving for the 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game between the present and the future 
preferences. 
Being this an infinite game, the existence of a unique equilibria is a delicate 
issue. The authors postulate the future constancy of savings rates which in its 
simple framework leads to one solution. Peleg and \aagi (1973) define a Strotz- 
Pollak equilibrium where player p chooses the best response to the best responses of 
players q > p8. Goldman (1980) shows that a Strotz-Pollak equilibrium exist under 
quite general conditions. 
2.3 Recent Studies 
Ainslie (1991) summarizes some psychology studies involving time decisions, an- 
alyzing their possible consequences on economic models. He starts by pointing out 
the example mentioned in the introduction, which is clearly a case of time inconsis- 
tent preferences. He also refers studies where individuais "choose annual discount 
rates in the thousands of percenV. Prelec and Loewenstein (1997) cite studies where 
the discount rate is even negative! Given this background it is hard to design a solid 
intertemporal decision theory. 
sIn a Ní^Ii equilibrium lie would pick tlie best response to the best responses of ali ^ p players. 
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Nevertheless Ainslie refers the hyperbolic-like discount function {b + at)~l as the 
one that fits best the data. The parameters a and b should be close to one. Ainslie's 
motivation is to conciliate these findings with a rational behaviour. He argues that 
an individual when confronted with a decision between A and B (like "stay up" and 
"go to bed"), uses a hyperbolic discount to match the possibilities, whose result 
rnay be "irrational" (staying awake, because the weight given to immediate pleasure 
is higher than tomorrow's fatigue). But if the decision happens to be between 
sequences of A's and B's, he may aggregate the separate Utilities and conclude that 
the other option (going to bed) may be better. In this case although he prefers 
staying up in the immediate run, he knows he will prefer it again next time. So in 
order to maximize present aggregate utility he will opt for the bed. 
Ainslie (1992) contains an immense number of references of psychological studies 
involving time decisions by individuais. He shows that there are innumerous types 
of behaviour and motivations observable, like commitment strategies, games inside 
one's mind, etc... On one hand the hypothesis proposed by other authors seem to 
be real, on the other it is hard to say what kind of theoretical model should be used 
due to the absence of a pattern9. Unfortunately the experimental studies did not 
change much the way economists analyzed and modelled time inconsistency. 
Laibson (1996) backed by Ainslie's work reintroduces the Phelps and Pollak 
(1968) model (and discount10), modelling the behaviour of a time inconsistent indi- 
vidual as a conflict inside his mind, or as Laibson puts it, between different "selves". 
In his finite game the individual chooses a consumption/savings strategy (there is 
9Prelec and Loewenstein (1997) cite innumerous and seemingly contradictory behaviours. 
10Laibson argues that quasi-hyperbolic discounting "mimics the qualitative property of the hyperbolic discount 
function". As we mention above, this is a very strong assumption. 
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an asset with exogenous return). Laibson shows that there is a unique equilibrium 
which is a Markov perfect equilibrium, that is one where the strategy is a function 
solely of the state variable, in this case the asset holdings11. In the infinite game 
he considers the limit of this equilibrium. The strategy is linear in wealth, so that 
it is equivalent to the exponential case. Laibson remarks that observationally the 
two discounts are in this sense equal. However if we let the exogenous rate of return 
change, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution will be lower (under general con- 
ditions) than the inverse of the coefficient of relative risk aversion (which is constant 
by assumption of the utility function) as observationally, but not theoretically. hap- 
pens. Another very important result is that the savings rate is Pareto dominated by 
the savings rate that the individual would choose if we could set ali periods rates. 
Laibson suggests innumerous policies that would enable the consumers in some way 
to follow their desired consumption path given their apparent incapacity to do it by 
their selves. 
In his next work Laibson (1997) gives the sophisticated consumer the choice 
between a liquid and an illiquid asset with the same rate of return. He models 
illiquidity assuming that the asset is sold one period after the selling decision. In the 
equilibrium the individual always holds some quantity of the illiquid asset, which is 
used to limit the future "selves" decisions. In general equilibrium (with production) 
this economy happens to have a high comovement of consume and income even for 
wealthy consumers as expected from econometric studies. 
'^lore on Markov perfect equilibria in Pudenberg and Tirole (1991). 
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List of Possible Intertemporal Behaviours 
Constant Discount Optimal plans are always consistent one with the 
other 
Naive Believe they will be able to stick to the present opti- 
mal plan but keep discarding it and rethinking a new 
one every period 
Sophisticated Recognize their inconsistent preferences and follow a 
subgame perfect equilibrium 
no commitment Present self has no control on future selves 
full-commitment Has total control on his future actions so that he fol- 
lows the optimal plan conceived at the initial period 
partial-commitment Some control on the future using real (illiquid assets 
that compel future savings) or mental (self-control 
that enables some plan to be taken for some interval 
of time) commitment devices 
The first model in continuous time12 appears in Barro (1997) and Barro (1999), 
which is basically the Ramsey (1928) model with time inconsistent preferences, 
more precisely with hyperbolic discounting and sophisticated agents. Assuming 
a strategy linear in wealth the representative agent maximizes aggregate utility 
taking into account that the continuum of "selves" that follow will use the same 
strategy. As Laibson (1996) already pointed out, Barro shows that in the case of 
logarithmical utility the substitution and income effects cancel out and the model 
is equivalent to the Ramsey model with exponential discount, just having a lower 
savings rate. Once again they are observationally alike and it's hard to sustain this 
12Another continuous time model is Karp (■2004a) though it is the limit case of a discrete time problem. 
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result. Barro mentions that it would be necessary to estimate short- and long-run 
discount rates to establish the difference. Another possibility would be the existence 
of commitment devices, which is actually what Laibson (1997) does. Barro is not 
convinced about a pure game-theoretical model nor about a full-commitment case. 
so he suggests that partial-commitment is probably the one closest to reality. His 
suggestion is to model this commitment as the ability to precommit to a consumption 
path during some small fixed time interval. This could be done by some institutional 
mechanism or by self-control. The partial-commitment solution lies as expected 
between the full-commitment and the game equilibria. This is relevant because 
the former Pareto dominates the latter. As in Laibson (1996) Barro recognizes the 
importance of this result in policy design. The raising number of ATM s clearly 
harms the commitment capacity of consumers. Finally he also solves the problem 
for a general isoelastic utility function, showing that the steady state is formally 
equivalent, but the dynamics are not. Anyway the individual would also prefer to 
have some commitment device. 
t 
0'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) perform a simple theoretical thought experience 
in order to get a grip on the meaning of the different approaches. They introduce 
the terminology "present-biased preferences" which stands for any discount with de- 
creasing discount rate in the short run. They point out that the naive/sophisticated 
question has been put quite aside, arguing that it is not obvious why we should just 
focus our attention on sophisticated agents (with or without commitment). for ali 
of ris have naive and sophisticated behaviours. Naives are just agents who "beheve 
that they are time consistent" so that they never use commitment devices. Everyday 
examples of such an attitude are common and consequently they regret the usual 
lack of arguments for the assumption of sophisticated agents. They settle the dif- 
23 
ferences between sophisticated and naive agents comparing simple situations, like 
choosing among four movies that come in an increasing quality sequence. In this 
example the sophisticate chooses to watch the first and worst one! The rationale 
is only perceivable under the theoretical sophisticated behaviour. Knowing that he 
would not get a grip on his impatience and would not be able to wait until the 
last and best movie, the first period self realizes that he gets maximum utility (re- 
member he is present-biased) watching the first movie, so that "sophisticates have 
even worse self-control problems in this situation". Sophisticates restrict voluntarily 
their actions, which is reasonable, but the example mentioned above is a nonsense. 
A last issue they discuss worth noting is the Pareto optimality question. In the game 
between the selves it can happen that there is no optimum, and given the nature 
of the players in the game, the Pareto condition is too strong, so they propose a 
"long-mn perspective" aggregating the instant Utilities without any discount. 
Harris and Laibson (2001) try a stochastic buffer stock consumption environment 
with quasi-hyperbolic discounts and sophisticated agents. They actually were able 
to present a difference equation13, which they call Hyperbolic Euler Equation, for 
the consumption choices. By analogy with the exponential Euler Equation, where 
the consumer sets the present value (using the constant discount factor) of marginal 
utilities equal, they derive an endogenous discount factor for the quasi-hyperbolic 
discount. This factor is a function of the marginal propensity to consume in the next 
period, which is non-constant. The idea is that the "selves" of period t and t+l have 
different views on the consumption/savings choice of period t+l, being the first 
more in favour of a higher savings rate. Saying this, Harris and Laibson get endoge- 
nous annual discount rates between 5% and 41% for the same discount parameters! 
13Recall that we are in a game-theory environment, so that a difference equation is usually impossible. 
24 
They argue that this result can be an explanation for the life cycle anomalies in con- 
sumption decisions, namely a low savings rate among younger workers and a high 
savings rate among older people. The fundamental conclusion is the importance of 
hyperbolic discounting in stochastic models. 
Frederick, Loewenstein amd CTDonoghue (2002) and Laibson (not dated) are 
two excellent literature reviews on time discounting. Examples of application of this 
approach to different issues include Karp (2004b) on environmental policies and 
Diamond and Kõszegi (2003) on retirement savings decisions of consumers. 
Weitzman (2001) builds a "discount rate interpreter" with more than 2000 in- 
quines, where the inquiry taker is asked for a (constant) subjective discount rate 
that should be used in the evaluation of environmental problems. Using the prob- 
ability distribution of ali the answers (fitted with a gamma distribution) he builds 
an actual discount function, which he calls "gamma discount", where each constant 
discount is weighted by its probability. Surprisingly he comes to a hyperbolic-like 
discount function: (1 + at)'b (with o, ò > 0) whose discount rate is which is 
decreasing in time. 
2.4 Criticai Analysis of Time Inconsistency 
Our first point is to distinguish between two kinds of intertemporal decision, what 
we shall call a "A-or-B" decision (any decision with a finite number of choices) and 
a continuous decision like a consumption flow. It is not clear why they should be 
treated equally. In a "continuous" decision the compared utility leveis stand for the 
global instant utilities of an agent in that period, but in a "A-or-B" one the decision 
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is just chi a marginal instant utility1'1. In this sense the game approach proposed for 
sophistieateci agents eonfronted with continuous decisions cannot be transposed as 
it lias been widely done to A-or-B decisions, because the game should be done on 
the global ntility. The incongrnous results in 0'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) are a 
such example. 
The "sophisticate" concept is also a difficult one. First proposed by Phelps and 
Pollak (1968) as an inter-generational game and Pollak (1968) as "inter-selves" game, 
has sometimes been taken as the only possible behaviour of hyperbolic agents15. 
This option is usually said to be backed by Ainslie (1991) and Ainslie (1992). In the 
first work where Ainslie proposes (note, it is a proposal) a game approach, he was 
addressing a A-or-B choice and arguing that eonfronted with a sequence of decisions 
the individual recognizes his inconsistency repudiating his immediate-run choices, 
and binding himself (denying his immediate impulses) to a long-run strategy. The 
sophisticate has a different altitude: knowing how he (actually his next "self) will 
act according to his short-run impulses, he takes his best choices today also in his 
short-run perspective. The "A-or-B sophisticate" and the "continuous sophisticate" 
do not act 'as Ainslie proposed. 
Another difficulty has been the definition of an optimum. The work of Laibson 
and Barro show how important the existence of commitment devices is in achieving 
a higher utility for ali selves. But what about cases where this is not possible? VVhen 
considering different individuais the strong Pareto requirements are quite acceptable, 
uOthcT criticai a.spects regardmg "A-or-B" and "continuous" decisions which are not directly linked with time 
inconsistency are the additiveness of Utilities and the estimation of time discounts which are always done using 
"A-or-B" decisions. 
'"Recail that the full, partial or none commitment approaches are only applicable for sophisticates. 
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but the different "solves" are just the same person. There should be othor criteria 
when there is no Pareto optimum. The long-run perspective of O Donoghue and 
Rabin (1999) is a strong candidate bnt will an individual accept a possible policy 
change in order to achieve this kind of optimum? 
The most reasonable rnodelling of time inconsistent preferences is in our opinion 
a mixture of naive and sophisticated individuais. An adaptation of the Calvo í 1983) 
price rigidity model is a strong candidate. Recall that rigid prices are modelled as 
the consequence of the uncertainty of producers on knowing when they will be able 
to set their prices again. Transposing to our problem we would have an individual 
who does not know whether he will act as a sophisticate or if he will follow his 
impulses just maximizing the present selfs utility. 
We feel that issues involving time delays are probably the ones where the differ- 
ence between exponential and hyperbolic discounting will be greatest. An example 
would be the global warming, where the marginal consequences of the present ac- 
tions are only noticeable within ten or more years. Despite the large number of 
papers on environmental economics with hyperbolic discount it heis been common 
procedure not to consider this long delay. 
2.5 Related Asset Pricing Literature 
C.iven this background the purpose of this work is to explore the consequences of 
hyperbolic discounting on asset pricing. Moreover to check if it brings a new insight 
into the equity premium puzzle. The puzzle was posed bv Mehra and Prescott 
(1985), who showed that the actual risk premium is extremely high compared to the 
thoorotical tortvasts. For a coinprehensive review on the equity premium and some 
of the unsuccessful attempts to explain it see Kocherlakota (1996). 
Kocherlakota (2601) addresses the question of whether asset market data could 
and does reveal time inconsistent preferences. Considering the bond market his 
answer is no even in theory. He then focnses his attention to commitment assets 
(like retirment plans) arguing that they could theoretically reveal a non-constant 
discount, but Kocherlakota does not find any of its consequences in the observations. 
\\e show below that his conclusion on the bond market is not robust. 
Luttmer and Mariotti (2003) establish the state prices for an arbitrary discount 
function. They show, in line with Harris and Laibson conclusion, that consumption 
becomes highly volatile in wealth. In a previous version, Luttmer and Mariotti 
admitted the hypothesis of time inconsistency leading to higher risk premia, being 
it a possible explanation for the observed high equity premia. But this is not the 
case as we show in latter sections. 
3 General Equilibrium Asset Pricing 
The issue of uncertainty will be addressed later so that we start by establishing the 
main ideas in simple cases. For that reason we just consider one riskless asset in this 
section. Using the microeconomic behaviour statcd above in a general equilibrium it 
is possible to get an endogenous rate of return. The implications of the introduction 
of time inconsistency are then characterized. 
We will follow Brito (2004) and consider an exchange economy with exogenous 
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endowments, one asset and consumption of one physical perishable good. In every 
period there is a spot market for the asset and one real market for the good. \\e 
take the physical good to he the nurneraire. In period t the representativo agent 
receives the endowment yt > 0 and taking the price pt and the payoff vt of the asset 
as given he chooses his consumption and asset holdings at. He maximizes his 
aggregate utility given by 
m— 1 k 
k=0 j=l 
where m is the number of periods considered, /Sj the discount factor between pe- 
riod j — 1 and j, and u{.) is the instantaneous utility function which is increasing. 
strictly concave and homogenous of degree n e (—oo, 1]\{0}16 and verifies the Inada 
conditions. 
The procedure will consist of solving first for the partial equilibrium and the 
Radner general equilibrium afterwards imposing the market clearance. This will 
enable us to apprehend the consequences on the rate of return of the asset. 
3.1 Naive agents 
Recall that a naive individual does not recognize his time inconsistency. so that in 
every period he determines his optimal path, but he just follows it instantaneously. 
In the next period he redetermines a new optimal path. As a result we have to 
solve the three periods and the two periods problems. The first one tell us how the 
16We will not consider the case ri = 0 because it represents the logarithmic utility for CES utility functions. under 
which the hyperbolic and exponential discount have the same implications in the majority of the literature See 
Barro (1997) for exainple. 
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reprosentative ageat acts in the tirst period and how hc thinks he will act in the next 
two, and the second problem tell us how he really will act in the last two periods. 
Three ptnods 
In the tirst period we have a simple constrained optimization problem with six 
choice variables ct and rp for t = 0,1,2: 
max ■u(co) + Piu{ci) + PiPtufa) 
,C2,ao,«l ,0-2 
s.t. ct + ptat < yt + Vtat_i Ví = 0,1,2 
G-r = a2 = 0 
where the endowments, the prices and the payoffs of the assets are taken as given. 
The last condition means that the agent starts and ends without any asset holdings. 
The necessary and sufficient conditions for this problem17 are 
u
'(co) = ^1 A"'(ci) = ^2 Plp2u{c2) = A3 (1) 
A1P0 = ^2^1 A2P1 = A 3^2 (2) 
Co = Uo — PoQo ci = Vi + viao ~ Piaí C2 = 1/2 + V2a\ (3) 
It is not necessary to solve for Cq, cp and C2, because we are just interested in the 
general equilibrium outcome. This can be achieved imposing the market clearing 
conditions directly on the above equations, that is setting ct = yt for t = 0,1,2 
clearing the physical good market and at = 0 for t = 0,1,2 clearing the asset 
market18. From (1) we get the value of the multipliers and with them from (2) a 
relation between the price and the payoff of the asset. The rate of return of the 
17Note that we have a strictiy concave objective function and linear restrictions. 
18Actually by Walras' Law, if the real market is cleared then the asset market also will be. So at = 0 is a mere 
consequence. 
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asset rt is defined as their quotient that is (1 + rt) = vt/pt-\. In equilibrium the 
rates of return will be 
(l+r,) = flrd-)'"1 =.'3r1(l + 'í.)1-" M) 
v
 Vi J 
(l + d2e) = P2l(~) =/32l(l + 72)1 n. bjj V
 2/2 / 
where is the endowment growth rate in period t defined by I -f 7f = 7^-. Re- 
member that the naives believe they will act in period 1 as they planned in period 
0, but due to their present-biased preferences, the optimal plan in period 1 will be 
different. Consequently the rate of return in (5) is merely the expected rate in this 
naive economy. 
Two penods 
In period two the representative agent maximizes his utility again. He solves 
max u{c]) + fiiUÍyCo) 
Cl ,C2,ai A2 
s.t. ct < yt +vtat_x - ptat Vt = 1,2 
CL'2 = 0 
so that he sets 
u'(ci) = Aj ô\u\c2) = Ao 
Ai Pi = Ao vo 
Ci = 2/1 + v\ao ~ P\a\ Co = í/O + roOi. 
Imposing Ct = yt and at = 0 for t = 1,2 we get the general equilibrium rate of return 
I + ro = /ir1(-)'"1 = dr1(ld-72)1^. 16) 
v
 ,2/2 7 
(7) 
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which is the actual return rate at period t = l. 
Proposition 1 Formally and observationally the general equilibrium solution with 
naive agents is the same as the exponential discounting case. The difference lies in 
the (unrecognizable) misjudgment of agents about the future interest rate. 
Recall that the discount factors of hyperbolic discounting agents tend to one, 
that is (3i < P2 fz 1- This means that we always have 1 + r2e < 1 + r2. Due to 
the present-bias the agents would like to "overconsume" today, so that they want 
to borrow raising the interest rate ry, overestimating their savings abilities in the 
next period. This leads to the prediction of a lower interest rate r2e for the second 
period. But when they come to period 1, once again they want to "overconsume", 
raising the real interest rate ry. 
There is not much intuition for a naive general equilibrium, in opposition to the 
partial equilibrium-like interpretation we just presented. It can hardly be called 
an equilibrium, because an equilibrium should consist of a coincidence between the 
expected and the effective interest rate, something that does not happen here. It is 
merely an equilibrium in the sense that supply equals demand. 
We feel that the above suggested mixed approach19 can bring a new insight into 
problems of monetary economics with rational expectations. The partial equilibrium 
analysis of one naive agent inside a sophisticated general equilibrium is probably of 
some interest. Ali of this is beyond the aim of this work. 
19We thought of addressing a inodel having both a naive and a sophisticated representative agent, but there was 
a conceptual problenr how would the naive enter a game with the sophisticate, that requires knowing how the 
sophisticate acts, without even recognizing his own time inconsistency?! 
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3.2 Sophisticated agents 
The sophisticates take into account how they will later default their own previous 
plans. Before determining how the representative agent with rational expectations 
behaves in period 0 we (and he) need to know the behaviour in the following periods. 
Thus the agent in period 0 is able to really maximize his aggregate utility20. This 
subgame perfect equilibrium will be the actual plan followed by the agent. The only 
exception is the case when A = A>, the constant discount case, where the optimal 
plan for period 1 is exactly the sarae seen from period 0 or 1. 
3.2.1 Sophisticated Backward Induction 
Period 2 
The consumer will maximize u^c?) subject to C2 < t^ai + 1/2 taking t'2, ai and ^ 
as given. The solution is simply c*2 = + 1/2 > 0. The amount t'2ai + y? which we 
shall call the wealth available in period 2 W2, is actually chosen by the self of period 
l21. 
Period 1 
In the eyes of period 1 self, next period's consumption is a function of the wealth 
W2 that he leaves to the next self, so we will write c^ud) = w2- The maximization 
problem now is 
max «(cí) + A"(c*(T;2)) 
ci,ai,u;2 
20This is in contrast with the naive where each self does not achieve the maximum utility possible. 
21Taking in consideration the choice of his next self, he will always chooses W2 = t'2ni + 1/2 > 0. since u'(0) = oo. 
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s.t. Ci < Wi — piai 
Uh = íhai + 1/2 
where u'i — t/i + ViOq is the wealth that period 1 self receives in the beginning of 
the period. In the optimum 
uíd) = Ái (8) 
— Aipi — A 2^2 = 0 (9) 
fllU (C2(w2))c£ (W2) + Áq = 0 (10) 
Wx = Ci + Pidi 
W2 = V2ai + 1/2 ■
From the first three equations we get Piu'{ci) = {c^iw^))■ Using the homo- 
geneity of the utility function this is equivalent to ( ,)n~l = From the last <
^2v^,27 PI 
two we get W2 = y2 + ~{wi—Ci). Putting both together we come to the sophisticated 
consumption demand 
^ + ^2 _ yi+viao + j^ 
ci[uji) - ^ — -  — (11) 
l+ft-n^)T^ 1 + ft-n + r2)—n 
Period 0 
We will introduce now period zero, that comes before the two periods used above. 
With this note we want to underline the importance of backward induction in a con- 
sistent hyperbolic case. Knowing how he will act in the next periods, the consumer 
maximizes his own time inconsistent preferences. He takes his response demand 
functions in next period as given22 as in any dynamic game. So he does not control 
22This does not mean that the consumer sees the response function a.s some exogenous function. The idea is that 
he knows that he is unable to control it, because there is no commitrnent device. 
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ci and C2, but controls directly the wealth w\ he leaves to the next self. and know- 
ing how the next self reacts controls indirectly W2- Note that wi = yi + fiGo anri 
W2 Ih ^2^1 ~~ V2 d- ^"(^1 ^1(^1))* 1 bs optimization problem is 
max "(co) + PiuicKwi)) + 
co,ao,wi ,W2 
CO < Ijo - Poao 
W\ = yi + ci «o 
W2 = y2 + — (wi — cKwi)) 
P\ 
The solution of the maximization is provided by 
u'(co) = Ai (12) 
Aipo T A2C1 = 0 (13) 
/liu'(ci(tni))ci'(rí;i) + A2 - A3 —(1 - c^u.'!)) - 0 (14) 
Pi 
*'/ plp2u{c*2{w2))c2 {W2) + X3 = o (15) 
Q) — Vo ~ Poao 
Ml = Pi + VlClo 
Mo = y2 H {Ml — Cl{w\)) 
Pl 
where the derivatives that represent the response of the next selves are c('(ii'i) = 
(^1+ /31T^(1 + and c^(u;2) = 1. 
Market Clearing 
VVe vvill impose now an equilibrium in the physical good market setting the con- 
sumption and the endowments equal c* = yt, which obviously leads to an equilibrium 
in the asset market vvith at = 0 for t = 0,1,2. Setting cÔ = yo and cj = pi in equa- 
tions (8) to (10) and solving for ^ = (1 + r2) leads to the endogenous real interest 
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rate in the second period 
1 -f r2 = p/f1 = ^-'(l + 72)1-". (16) 
In the case I + >2 = I the interest rate will be /Jf1 as expected. But the main 
feature of this model is seen in the interest rate for the first period. Setting c* — yt 
in ali periods in equations (12), (14) and (15) and then substituting the multipliers 
in (13) it becomes 
d += ri =  ^/o)  
"oA«'(y.)è + AA»'(!/2)S(l-Íl) 
which after substituting the derivative and the equilibrium interest rate (16) and 
some tedious algebra turns into 
■ •as)1 ■(-Msrx-oy 
= + 71)1-n(l + A(1 +72r)(l +/52(1 + 72)n)~1. (17) 
Depending on the case this reduces to 
• with constant endowment y0 = yy — y2 : 
1 1 _ 1 + /3i 
1
" ãõTftj; 
• (time consistent preferences) with P2 = Pf '■ 
i + n =/?r1(1 + 7i)1_n; (18) 
• with constant endowment and time consistency : 
1 + r1 = 8^. 
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3.2.2 Analysis 
For the ease of comparison with the time consistent case we will change the 
notation defining a = fhfti1, performing the change —> afh- The parameter a is a 
measure of inconsistency. The case a = 1 stands for time consistent preferences and 
a > 1 for "present-biased" preferences, like the so-called ■ihyperbolic discounting" 
preferences23. The equilibrium interest rate (17) becomes 
1 + ri =/dj ^1 + 71)1 "^1 +/3i(l + 72)"^ + a/3i(l + 72)"^ . (19) 
The new features introduced by time inconsistent preferences lie in the comparison 
between (19) and +7i)1~n the exponential discounting endogenous interest 
rate. 
It is common in the literature to assign values to the discount factors and compare 
the results, for example setting 1,/5i,/32,/3f,... for the exponential discounting and 
l, fii, Pifa, PifaPs, ••• for the hyperbolic. But there is no special reason for having the 
first discount factors (1 and Pi) equal, in other words that choice does not make the 
two discount sequences equivalent or comparable. It would resemble the comparison 
of two exponential discounts with two different discount rates that obviously lead to 
different consequences. This procedure does not identify observational differences. 
We will be choosing the discount factors of the exponential and the hyperbolic 
discounts so that they bare the same result for the real interest rates in a benchmark 
case and then check the changes due to variations in parameters. 
Our benchmark will be the constant endowment process. that is 1 + = 1 for 
23The a < 1 case is psychologically irrelevant. 
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t = 1.2. (livon the discount factors fix and (y[3\ of the hyperbolic discount, the 
oxponential discount factor ôe that will yield an interest rate (18) equal to (19), 
inaking both observationally equivalent, is given by /íe = 'j' ^. 
lhe comparison (with variable endowments) will involve the exponential dis- 
count ing interest rate 
1 + rie =
 Ã(TTykj(1+7i)1"' (2,)) 
and the hyperbolic discounting interest rate 1 + rq from (19). 
Future endowments 
Proposition 2 In opposition to exponential discounting, the equilibrium interest 
rate with sophisticated agents depends on the endowment growth rate of future pe- 
nods. Moreo ver if the elasticity of substitution is low (n < D) a future endowment 
growth (72 > 0^ acts just like an immediate endowment growth would, it increases 
the interest rate. But for high elasticities it decreases the interest rate. This effect 
grows obviously with a. 7/72 = 0 both rates coincide. 
Proof Note that (19) is strictly decreasing in (1+72)" because a > 1, and (1+72)" 
is increasing in 72 if n > 0 and decreasing otherwise ■ 
Without hyperbolic discounting, no rnatter how the endowment would change 
from period 1 to period 2, the rate of return between periods 0 and 1 was constant. 
But the effect of 72 is not straightforward. The value of (1 + 72)" grows with 72 
if n > 0 (high intertemporal elasticity of substitution) and decreases for n < 0 
(low intertemporal elasticity of substitution). Remembering that o- > 1, the rate of 
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return in (19) vvill decrease with 72 for n > 0 and increase otherwise. The intuition 
is the following: there are two opposite forces influencing the agents' decisions due 
to the sophisticated game strategy. First the "present-bias" that makes them keen 
on borrowing in order to raise the present utility, and second the awareness that his 
next self is also present-biased so that the present self wants to save to contradict 
this future over-consumption. 
Usually if the agents know that the endowments will grow in the next period 
and have concave preferences (which they do here, so that they prefer a smoother 
consumption sequence) they want to borrow against the future endowments. raising 
the interest rate in the general equilibrium. By raising we mean being higher than 
the inverse of the discount factor /S-1. 
The present-bias of hyperbolic discounting may increase this effect21 if the future 
(two periods from now) endowments also grow. The previous self (two periods 
before the endowment growth) recognizes this and may want to anticipate even 
further the future growth by selling assets. This is the case if he has a low elasticity 
of substitution (n < 0) and wants to smooth even further the consumption. On 
the other hand he may recognize that his next self will have an excessivo behaviour 
that he cannot control. In this case he will save more than he would do without the 
endowment growth. This happens for 0 < n < 1. As in Laibson (1996) the effects 
cancel out when n = 0. This last situation is rather interesting: an endowment 
growth causes a decrease in the interest rate, something that never happens for -q. 
Consider a numerical example. Suppose that "fi — 0, 72 = ±0.10 and Je = 0.S0. 
24Recall that we are comparing hyperbolic discounting and compensated exponential discounting, which implies 
that the short-run discount factor is indeed higher for the hyperbolic discount 
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Figure 3 shows the general equilibrium rate of return of the asset depending on the 
degree of homogeneity of the instant utility function for three different discounts. 
Fhe continuous line is the exponential case, where nothing changes. The long- 
dashed curve represents the most "present-biased" or "time inconsistent" (higher 
a) hyperbolic discount. Depending on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution 
the interest rate can change up to 6 percentual points. 
-4 
Figure 3: Rate of return of the riskless asset depending on the degree of homogeneity of u(.). a) 
Endowment Growth 72 = 0.1; b) Endowment Decrease 72 = —0.1. continuous line - exponential 
discount 3e = 0.8; fine dashed line - a = 1.2 (/3i = 0.74, P2 = 0.88); long dashed line - a = 1.49 
(di = 0.67, P2 = 0.99). 
Present Endowment Growth 
Proposition 3 The interest rates react in the same fashion to 7!. Nevertheless it 
amplifies/contradicts the ejject of future endowments in the time inconsistent case, 
depending on their signals. 
The constant endowment growth {y0 — y, yi = Sy, í/2 = S2y) case illustrates this 
point. The interest rate in (19) becomes and (20) becomes 
These formula are quite similar and its interpretation is also quite similar to the 
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earlier paragraph. Note that the new term due to 71 is just "n in both for- 
mula, meaning that the introduction of endowrnent growth in period 1 has the same 
(multiplicative) impact on the rate of return of the exponential and the hyperbolic 
discounting case. This is because the growth change does not affect the choices of 
period 2 self, having no impact on the game. 
Estimation of implicit discounts 
Both points may be seen the other way around: for equal observed interest rates, 
different implicit discount factors may be estimated depending on whether one con- 
siders hyperbolic discount not. The effects are explained above so we just present an 
example. For 1 + r = 1.10, n = -1 and 71 = 0.01 one has the exponential discount 
factor Pe = 0.927, but A = 0.99 and /?2 = 0.866 with 72 = -0.03 would vield the 
same interest rate. Nevertheless with more observations one could estimate 3i and 
P2 uniquely. 
Proposition 4 Except for the 72 = 0 case, it is possible to distinguish between 
exponential and hyperbolic discounts. 
One way to test the non-constant discount using market data is to check the 
significance of the 72 parameter when regressing the return rate of short-term bonds. 
This is a direct consequence of proposition 2. 
Kocherlakota (2001) concludes the opposite in a similar model. The argument 
is that there exists a consistent time discount that yields the same return rates as 
any inconsistent discount. This conclusion in not robust for three reasons. First the 
consistent discount factors that would lead to the same results are a function of the 
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oiulowments. riuM(> is no rcason for vvhy an agent shoukl discount time depemling 
ou the endowment growth, it contradicts tlic^ v(n"y essence of time discount. Second 
he uses uon-statiimary discount fuuctions which is reasonable for microecouomical 
models fmt are hardly eonceivable in general equilibrium. Why should the market 
have d.bõ as the immediate discount factor today and 0.90 tomorrow? vVt last 
the non-statiouary discount function that Kocherlakota builds requires having the 
discount factor at time t between period f + i - \ and t + i, call it /i-, respecting 
d' = for ali j = 1 i. Recail that in general (in Kocherlakota^ discount 
function) 4 ^ df which makes the above condition an unlikely coincidence. 
4 Time inconsistency Facing a Risky and a Riskless Asset 
In this secion the implications of hyperbolic discounting on the return rates of 
assets (with and without risk) under uncertainty are analyzed. After solving the 
stochastic model with sophisticated agents we compare the interest rate of a bond 
under deterministic and stochastic endowment processes. Next the risk premium, 
the return surplus of an equity, is examined. It is concluded that hyperbolic dis- 
counting does not bring a new insight into the equity premium puzzle. 
The following framework is used: an extension of the above model, that is an 
exchange economy with consumption, exogenous uncertain endowmcnts and 3 peri- 
ods. There is a physical perishable good, which will be taken as numerairc, and two 
assets, one riskless a like a bond and the other with risk c, like an equity. The return 
rate of the former will be independent of the endowment realization but not that of 
12 
the later. Note that two assets for two states of nature rnean complete rnarket.s"J. In 
each period there is a spot market for both assets and a real rnarket for the physical 
good. The sophisticated representative consumer takes the endowments. the prices 
and the payoffs of the assets as given. Due to the time inconsistency of preferences. 
we will solve the game between the multiple "'selves of the representative consumer 
with rational expectations. 
The uncertainty has a basic structure: at every node there are two possible future 
states of nature as shown in Figure 4. The number assigned to every node in the 
figure stands for the index that will be used to address that node. The first digit is 
the period number, and the second the state of nature. The state ij happens with 
probability tt^ from the perspective of period 0 self. 
25Actually the payoffs matrix also has to be non-singular. But we have one bond that has the same payoff for 
both states, and one equitv with different payoffs, so that the matrix is always non-singular 
21 
0 
24 
Figure 4: Information structure for the three periods case 
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4.1 Two poriods 
C")nco again. <lua to tha game natura of the sophisticates' behaviour, vve need to 
solw the prohlem of the period 1 self, which takes his availahle wealth W\ as given 
and then makes his eonsumption/savings decisions26. Only then we see how and 
whv period d self ehooses »■,. Period 1 self already knows in which node he is in, so 
we will not use the index 11 or 12 bnt only 1, and denote the possible future states 
of nature by 21 and 22. with conditional probability (from period l perspective) 
ttoj i = or 2^ for s = 1.2. He ehooses his consumption Ci, his bond «j and his 
equity holdings, solving 
max «(c,) + d1£:i[u(c2)] = + ,Hi(7r2i|iu(c21) + 
Pl <C2\X22,0-\ 
s.t. wx > cx+paax+peex 
!J2s + Va2sa\ + Ve2sei > c2á s =1,2 (21) 
taking ali the prices p, payoffs v and endowments y as given. The Índices a and e in 
the prices and payoffs rnean asset and equity. wx stands for the wealth available in 
the beginning of period 1 (later we will have wx = yx + vn\0-i) + ueleo). The ntility 
function u{.) is once again homogenous of degree n, increasing and strictly concave. 
The lagrangean function for this problem is 
L = u(ci) + Hi(7r21|]u(c2i) + 7r22|iu(c22)) + 
2 
T Ai(í/'i — Ci — paai — pecx) + A2s(y2a + va2Sax + í,y2,se1 — c23) 
,1=1 
The optirnal strategies are characterized by 
n'(cx) = A, (22) 
26Actually we should start by period '2, but ívs before the last self will consimie ali his strictly positive wealth 
available due to u'(Oj = and u'{.) > 0. 
1 1 
P\^2s\\U {C2s) = A2,, s — 1.2 ^23; 
2 
-^iPe = ^2.3v023 0 = a.e l'24j 
.9=1 
Wl = Cl + paGi + p^Ci 2 O 1 
y2s + ya29al + CÇ23C1 = C23 S = 1.2. 46; 
Equations (24) can be written as Sf = where 5i = {pa.pe) is the price vector. 
t'2 the payoíf matrix and r/2 = (r/2i, r/22) = (A21/A1. A22/Ai) the state price vector. If v 
is non-singular, which it is, then the solution is obviously r/,f = )~lSl . Xow. we 
will be needing the solutions for the consumption demand in order to compute (later) 
the responses of period 1 self to period 0 self actions. Using this result. equations 
(22), (23), (25) and (26) and the homogeneity of the instant utility function (which 
implies that u'{x)/u'{y) = (x/y)"-1 and u'{x)x = nu(x) by the Euler theorem) we 
come to 
tCl 4~ yV-, q2ay2a 27) 
1 + 1 
♦ / \ / Ç23 \ " 1 W1 + '^2a=i Q2ay2a , _ i o , Ov , C29 »'l = 1  )  7 1 3^ S-1.2 (JS) 
Recall that ali the q come from the exogenous (from the representarive agent's 
perspective) prices and payoffs of the assets, so that the period 0 self knowing these 
functions can fullv evaluate the responses of the next selves to his savings decisions. 
4.2 Three periods 
Before seeing how he does that, a word on notation is needed. There will be 
now two states in period l. but from each node there are only two possible states of 
nature in period 2, so the above expressions still applv, taking in eonsideration that 
trom stnlo 1 1 tluno are tho states 21 and 22 possible, and froin 12 there are 23 and 
24. ("oncorning thn prohahilities from period 0 perspectáve, /r^spi is now /to^/tth for 
> 1.2 and 12 is now «t-».,/tti-» for .s = 3, 4. 
\\d 'gain denote the exogenous response functions with an asterisk, for 
■ wpie in state 1 of period 1 we have cj, = ('^(tnn) which is act.ually given by 
The consumer in period 0 now solves 
max í/(co) +/3i ^[«(ci)] +/3i/?2£'o[^(c2)] = (29) 
co.ao.eo.UM i.u'i2 
"(Cq) + Tl TTlsU{ClsiWls)) + 
s
-t- 1/0 > c0 + PaOaO + PeOeO 
w\s — Uls + valsaO T í;else0 s = 1,2. 
The solution is given by: 
Ao = tt'(co) (30) 
■ia 
An, = Ti7ria"'(qjc;/(ií;l3) +/3I/?2 TC2au'{c*2(7)c*2a'{wis) 5=1,2(31) 
a~'2s- 1 
AkiAq — ^i3veis 0 — a,e (32) 
5—1 
Po = Co + PaOaO + PojCq (33) 
teia = yis + valsa0 + velseo s = 1,2. (34) 
The derivatives from (27) and (28) are given by: 
cl/('/'i,,) - (•+ 7■-''7') •''■-1,2 
1 
cr -2s — 1 
i __ 
r/25 ^ 1 I \ " I / . / , ^'irt \ 1 
•-
v
"' = (ãkd + "t 
— N 1 1
 1 5=1,2 
o 1 
4>..) = 
^ '^1 K-ia ' V 7 
-1 
•S = 3. i 
Equations (32) can once again be expressed matricially by Sj^ = vfq{ v/hose 
solution is ([[ = (wf . The solutions for the consumptions can be found using 
this solution together with equations (30) to (35). 
Mnrket equ i li b ri u rn 
In the two periods problern clearing the market means imposing c'23 = jjo3 for ali 
s and Cj = yi which leads to «i = ei = 0 and the endogenous state prices. From 
(22) and (23) there will be an equilibrium in the goods and asset markets when 
r/2a =/^i7r23|i(,y2â/,yi)n 1 s= E2 (36) 
Now setting an equilibrium in the three periods problem means cq = yo- c'l3 = yis 
for s = 1.2 and = jj23 for s = so that vve achieve a relation for the 
endogenous rates of return of the-assets. Xote that even though (30) and (31) 
and their complements (35) are bigger than (22) and (23), every variable is already 
determined (either in period 1 problem or by the equilibrium conditions) so we get 
automatically the values for the lagrangean multipliers. 
Ao = n{ijo) (37) 
v dln\sU {yis) + dl do E;=2.-l Kl<yU iy-cr)y2c7/ IJls 1 0 00^ /\ i o — " Õ "X I — (oo ) 
1 -E do Et -'>s-I 4" ^"v)n 
where vve used = (f^"- bhe y.ts stand for the stochastic grovvth rates 
of the endovvments, which are dehned as 
(i + x.s) = yis/yo s=i.2 
O f Tin ) = u-is/uw * =1.2 
(1 + ^2,0 = !hs/{l\i .^ = 3,4 
rhe \]S olearlv simplities to the value of 7ri,,í/(yls) in the exponential case: [i\ = fo- 
.4 hond and an equity 
Consitiering a hond and a stock \ve have the following rates of return 
— 1 + 'i — =l + rl3 s = 1,2 P,l0 PcO 
+ _£^_i + r2s 5-1,2 
= 1 + Í22   = 1 + 02,, S = 3, 4. 
Pal2 Pel2 
From (32) \ve can nse these rates to get the following relation that holds in the 
eqnilibrium: 
1 = + ^ + (40) 
l = (l + nohl + d + nn^. (41) 
ao AQ 
4.3 Analysis 
As mentioned above the strategical decisions of the individuais under nncertainty 
is far more complex with present-biased preferences. The conseciuences are however 
negligible, both quantitatively and qualitatively. The return rates of the riskless 
asset is firstly consirlered. 
ts 
4.3.1 Bond return wit.h uncertainty 
From (40) the bond will yield an equilibrium interest rate of 
a-i l + ^i — /3j (l+7i) n—1 
l + +^2)n 
1 + i?! [( 1 + 72 j"] . 
(42) 
which is just the stochastic version of (17). 
Proposition 5 The uncertainty has the same effect on hond retums under constant 
and non-constant time discount, in the ,sen.se that the equihbnum return rates are 
in both cases given hy the expected value of the certainty return rate. 
This conclusion is straightforward. Xotice however that (42) contains expected 
values evaluated at t = 1. Depending on the 7 of each state of nature different leveis 
of knowledge asymmetry between period 0 and period 1 selves may arise. Consider 
the two following comparable extreme cases: A with 721 = 423 t1 "22 = '24 ând B 
with 721 = 722 ^ 723 = 724, both with 711 = 742 = 0. In the former period 0 self 
knows as much as the next but in the later there is no uncertainty at ali for period 1 
self. We should aspect different strategical decisions in the game of case B (case A 
is simply the certainty case using expected values) but this is not the case. On one 
hand period 0 self has the incitive to save, that is to give next period more decision 
power, in order to maximize revenue but on the other he may also be willing to take 
profit of the information, that the next self will have, right now. 
As a numerical example take 711 = "12 = f, Ji = 0.S, Aj := 0.95 and n = — 1 in 
both cases and then 721 = ">23 = 0.1 and 722 — 424 = —0.1 in A and = '22 = 0.1 
and 7-,3 = 724 = -0.1 in B. The equilibrium interest rates will be 1 + iA = 1.153 
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aiui 1 f = l.lãl. lt is easy to soe that this gap is hanlly wider for the acceptable 
rango of iiaramoters. 
■4.3.2 Risk Preniinni under Hyperbolic Discounting 
Fhe equilihrium return rate of the equity is more complex hut can be analyzed 
using its risk premium, defiued ms the expected surplus of its rate of return comparing 
to a safe asset. It was shown abovc that the bond has a stable behaviour. VVe define 
the equity premium of our stock as: 
■2 
EP = Eo[ri - q] = ^ nis{r]s - h) (43) 
5=1 
The model does not provide an endogenous equity premium for the asset returns are 
partially exogenous. It only assures that in equilibrium they satisfy the equations 
(41). Xote that (40) and (41) can be put together as 
0 = "Y"-(ri, ~ X) + (^ 12 — «i) 
ao Aq 
= -4 ] TT 11 (r ]| — tj) + Ayituirn — o) = E()[{r \ — q)/l] 
where .4, = . Using the definition for the covariance, cov0[x,y] = E0[xy] — 
E0[x]Eo[y] the above equation leads to 
n /= r ■ 1 eovofín - t,),/!] COVotr,, A] r 
=
 I " "1 = ^4]  = " = -(1 + (44) 
where the fact that q is a constant was used and equation (40) was written ;us 
■£o[-4] = (1 + q) '• 
_ y-.iiiri u] / o[aj| < [ w[1(,re a ( ) denotes the standard de- 
<70(ri i\)f7()(A) — 'v 7 
viation from the perspective of period 0, we know that the Sharpe ratio ^ 
fg) 
Using covoki - i] .-tj CTo(ri -ii )CTO(/1) 
imposes the following inequality 
- /qj| < n()(A) { .^ 
aciri) ~ Eo[A] 
which constitutes the Hansen-Jagannathan bound for this model. 
In order to understand these results we will start by writing .4, explicitly: 
1 '? n I - \n-l 1 + + 72)n] o ( \f. As = A(1 + /is) . \ rr \11 I dã 5-L2 ^ 1 + PiEu[[ l + 72) J 
which reduces to the usual form in case of time consistent preferences {3\ = -A = 3ey. 
As = /3e(l + 713)" 1 s=1.2. (47) 
Proposition 6 The general equilihrium nsk premium with time inconsistent pref- 
erences (44) 13 a functwn of future endowments due to the game between different 
selves. The nsk premia with inconsistent and consistent preferences are thus distin- 
gmshable. The absolute values of the equity premium c0^°;r4"'A' and the jr-f- ratio 
are however within a 40% range (with 10% maxtmum absolute endowment growth 
and admissible parameters for l3i,p2 and n) of the time consistent preferences case. 
Proof The tirst two conclusions are straightforward. Xow for the last conclusion 
we shall start from the benchmark with 70 = 0, that is the case where (46) and 
(47) are equal and check what happens when the 70 change. Consider the following 
upper bound for tlie covariance : |cov(a,ò)j < a[a)a[b). This bound is linear in a 
and b and so the increase in (44) is proportionally bounded by an increase in .4. 
Novv is
 ^PP^xiinatelv ^ + + = y + _ -yn. 
(Taylor approximation around (1 + 72)" = 0 with t = diytlpT < d.l for admissible 
discount factors. Using ^^[(l + 72)"] < niaxlT{(l + '2<j)n} an increase in .4,. 
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and rov(.d.,) due to 72 are also proportionally bounded by f(l + 72)" for some ^2 . 
I sing instead minfT{(l + 72^)"} < ^^[(l + 72)"] a decrease in the denominators 
will be proportionally bounded by e(l + 72)" for some 7^. Putting ali together an 
increase in both ratios mentioned in the proposition is proportionally bounded by 
1 which will be maximum for high values of |n| and I72I with > 0. 
Taking n = —5, e = 0.1 and 7^ = 7^ = —0.1 this bound is approximately 0.40 ■ 
The rates of return and the risk premium for the short-run assets bought in period 
0 depends on the endowments of period 2 as in the deterministic case. It is again 
the result of the intertemporal interaction between the consumption decisions of the 
different selves. 
To see the conclusions in the proposition we need to get the intuition of the 
exponential discounting risk premium, that is to focus on (44) and (47). Note that 
the exponent of the endowment growth in (47) n-1 is always negative because n < 1, 
and it is smaller for lower n that is for higher risk aversion. So if A is negatively 
correlated with r, that is the endowment growth 1 + 7 is positively correlated with 
rate of return of the equities in the period 1 77, then the equity risk premium is 
positive. This can be understood as follows. If the endowment will decrease the 
agents would like to save for the next period, that is a high rate of return would 
come in hand; if the endowment is expected to grow the agents want to borrow and 
a low rate of return would be more convenient. If the correlation between the rates 
of the equity and the endowment growth is negative, the equity will act exactly 
how the agents would like to. This implies that there would be a greater demand 
for equities, comparing to bonds, raising the equity price and lowering their rate of 
return and lowering the risk premium. The opposite applies, if the correlation is 
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positive the equity is not very desirable and the equity risk premium rises. 
In order to proceed to the hyperbolic discount we need a benchmark so that we 
compare two different discounts which depart from the same result in this bench- 
mark. Once again we will consider the simplest case and choose an exponential and 
a hyperbolic discount which yield the same interest rate for a bond. This means that 
when endowments are constant, so that there is no uncertainty, wre will require that 
Te = iih- In this situation the hyperbolic interest rate that we get from (40) together 
with (37) and (38) is the same we got in section 4 (17) with constant endowments. 
This implies that we should use the exponential discount factor 3e = again 
when comparing to the hyperbolic discount A, A/T. The same conclusion would be 
taken if we imposed the equality of (47) and (46). 
Our first step is to introduce endowment growth in period 1. This affects (47) 
and (46) exactly in the same way. The second step is to introduce endowment 
growth in period 2, which only affects the hyperbolic premium. But if by chance 
Ei,,[(l + 72)n] = l27 there would be still nothing new. To simplify the analysis we 
will just consider a case where both 72CT, with cr = 1, 2 if s = 1 and cr = 3. 4 if s = 2. 
have the same sign. 
The reasoning is now similar to section 4. The value of (1 -f 72)" grows with 72 
if n > 0 (low risk aversion and high intertemporal elasticity of substitution) and 
decreases for n < 0 (high risk aversion). Recall that cb > A. the value of (46) will 
increase with 72 for n > 0 and decrease otherwise. If the risk aversion is low [n > 0) 
a change in 72 has the opposite effect of 71 011 (46). That is it smoothes the effect 
27This would require a possible raise and a possible fali of the endowments in the two states of period 2 departing 
from the Is node. 
dosoribed in the previous chapter. If the risk aversion is large (n < 0) it emphasizes 
tlie etfect on A. 
So in addition to the reasons which also lead to a positive risk premium vvith 
exponential preferences, there is a positive premium if the representative agent is 
weakly risk averse {u > 0) and the endowment growth 72 is negatively correlated 
with the equity payoff or if he is strongly risk averse and the correlation is positive. 
The levei of the equity premium remains hovvever low and the Hansen-Jagannathan 
bound still is hardly satisfied for the observed data. Notice that in the case of the 
risk premium the bound is a lower and upper bound, because the covariance may be 
positive and negative. Taking random values for r and 7 the levei of the covariance 
may be higher in absolute terms, but its mean vvill not change. 
Proposition 7 The risk premium is in equilibrium only weakly affected by the In- 
formation structure. 
Put in other words, having period 1 self knowing more than period 0 self does 
not have a noticeable impact on the risk premium. This is a consequence of the 
resemblance of (42) and (46). The arguments used in Proposition 5 are applicable 
now, that is (46) is almost invariant to the information structure as it will happen 
with its correlation vvith the equity stochastic payoffs. 
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5 Conclusions 
The first aspect worth noting in our literature review is how inconsistent the 
literature on time inconsistent preferences is. There is still a hig work to do on its 
basics, for it fails to lead to simple and logical conclusions as O Donoghue and Rabin 
(1999) showed. The amazing part is that is very powerful in more complex models. 
The game-theory approach of time inconsistency clearly turns the asset pricing 
models more difficult, but they introduce new qualitative differences that are quite 
intuitive (even though the quantitative changes on the risk premium are not what 
we expected). The fact that future endowments appear in the general equilibrium 
rates of return is an example of this. There is no clear reason for which future 
endowments should not have an inífuence on today's interest rates, even if dealing 
just with short-run assets, like in the present model. If confirmed this may have 
a strong practical impact on the way the expected endowment growth rates are 
obtained from market data. 
These new features in the relation of sophisticated individuais with time show. 
looking at our results, how rich this analysis can be. It probably can bring a better 
insight into the issue of the slope of yield curves, where the nature of intertemporal 
decision making is even more important. 
In contrast to some literature, in our model time consistent and inconsistent 
individuais have a similar behaviour when confronted with stochastic situations. 
besides the distinctions mentioned for the deterministic cases. That is uncertainty 
does not induce new reactions between the selves. This is also valid when the next 
ÕÕ 
[htuhI self knows more about the possible states of nature. A direct implication of 
this is that equity premia have in equilibrium similar values. 
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